Supreme Court of United States.
*46 Mr. J. Ganson, for the appellant.
Mr. G.B. Hibbard, contra.
*51 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Sailing vessels, when approaching a steamer, are required to keep their course, and steamers, under such circumstances, are required to keep out of the way. Vessels propelled by sails are required to keep their course on account of the correlative duty imposed upon the steamer to keep out of the way, in order that the steamer may know the position of the object to be avoided and may not be led into error in her endeavor to comply with the requirement. Under the rule that the steamer must keep out of the way she must of necessity determine for herself, independently of the sailing vessel, whether it is safer to go to the right or *52 to the left or to stop, and in order that she may not be deprived of the means of determining the matter wisely, and that she may not be defeated or baffled in the attempt to perform her duty in the emergency, it is required by the rules of navigation that the sailing vessel shall keep her course and allow the steamer to pass either on the right or left, or to adopt such measures of precaution as she may deem best suited to enable her to perform her duty and fulfil the requirement of the law to keep out of the way. Rules of navigation, such as have been mentioned, are obligatory upon such vessels, when approaching each other, from the time the necessity for precaution begins, and they continue to be applicable as the vessels advance, so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain. They do not apply to a vessel required to keep her course after the approach is so near that the collision is inevitable, and are equally inapplicable to vessels of every description while they are yet so distant from each other that measures of precaution have not become necessary to avoid a collision.[*]
Injuries of a serious character were received by the schooner Frémont, owned by the libellant, on the twenty-ninth of November, 1869, in a collision which occurred on Lake Erie, about nine o'clock in the evening of that day, between the schooner and the propeller Wenona, in consequence of which the schooner sunk in the middle of the lake, and, with her cargo of salt, became a total loss. Damages were awarded to the libellant, as the owner of the schooner, by the decree of the District Court, in the sum of thirteen thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine dollars and fifty-two cents, and costs of suit, from which decree the respondents appealed to the Circuit Court, where the parties were again heard, and the Circuit Court reversed the decree of the District Court and entered a decree dismissing the libel, holding that the collision occurred solely through the fault of the schooner. Whereupon the libellant appealed to this court.
*53 Briefly stated, the facts of the case, as they appear to the court here, were substantially as follows: Bound on a voyage from the port of Oswego to the port of Sandusky, the schooner, just before the collision, was proceeding up the lake, heading southwest by west half west, and moving about five or six miles an hour. On the other hand, it appears that the propeller was bound on a voyage from Chicago to Buffalo, and was proceeding down the lake ten miles an hour, heading east by north half north. They were, therefore, sailing in nearly opposite directions, there being only a single point of variance, and the leeway which the schooner was making, as appears by the evidence, made the lines of their actual progress more nearly parallel. None of these facts are much disputed, and it is quite certain that the wind was south or south by east, and that the schooner, though making some leeway, was nearly closehauled. It was raining, and the night was somewhat dark, but the witnesses agree that there was no fog and not much mist on the water. Both vessels were seaworthy and well manned, and the evidence furnishes no reason to doubt that they both had good and sufficient lookouts properly stationed. Both vessels also showed signal lights, but it is insisted by the respondents that the signal lights of the schooner were not properly located on the vessel. Much discussion upon that subject, however, is unnecessary, as it clearly appears that the lights were burning brightly, and that they were seen by the propeller in ample season to have enabled her to adopt any and every proper precaution to have avoided a collision.
Two faults are ascribed to the schooner by the respondents, as follows: (1.) That she did not have good signal lights properly displayed, as required by law. (2.) That she changed her course, in violation of the fifteenth rule of navigation for preventing collisions on the water.
1. Enough has already been remarked to show that the first defence is not supported, without further discussion, and it is accordingly overruled.
2. More difficulty arises in disposing of the second, as *54 there is considerable conflict in the testimony upon that subject, which, doubtless, led to the difference of opinion between the District and Circuit Courts. Where there is no material conflict in the testimony of the witnesses, it is seldom difficult to decide such a controversy, as the rules of navigation are very plain and may be readily applied without much danger of mistake.
Errors committed at the moment of collision are to be regarded with less strictness than those committed when the vessels are more distant from each other, as such an error is often superinduced by an error of the other vessel committed at an earlier moment. In such a case much depends upon time and distance, as all experience shows that measures of precaution, in order to be effectual, must be seasonable, and it is well-settled law that if they are not so and a collision ensues in consequence of the delay, it is no valid defence on the part of the delinquent vessel to aver that nothing could be done at the moment to prevent the disaster. Inability to prevent a collision usually exists at the time it occurs, and in order to determine where the fault lies it usually becomes necessary to examine with care the conduct and orders of those in charge of the respective vessels from the time the vessels came in sight of each other to the time they came together, and such an examination frequently discloses the fact that the cause of the collision is to be found in some negligence or mismanagement of one or both vessels when they were at some distance from the theatre of the actual collision.[*] Difference of opinion as to the true state of the facts doubtless led to the contrariety of decision in the lower courts, and it is the same difference of opinion between the parties which makes each claim with confidence the favorable decision of this court. All agree that it was the duty of the propeller to adopt the necessary precautions to keep out of the way, and the respondents insist that they complied with that requirement, but the libellant denies that proposition and contends that they did not adopt any precautionary *55 measure for that purpose in season to render it effectual. Perfect concurrence of views is also entertained by the parties that it was the duty of the schooner to keep her course, but the respondents contend that the schooner violated that requirement, and that the charge made in argument against the propeller, that she did not adopt proper and seasonable precautions, is not supported by the evidence. Evidently, therefore, the decision of the court must turn upon the view taken of the evidence. Such being the state of the case the court has looked carefully into the evidence and is of the opinion, after a deliberate consideration of the same, that the theory of fact assumed by the libellant is correct.
Proper signal lights were displayed by the schooner, and in addition to that requirement it appears that the mate, when the two vessels were a mile and a half apart, exhibited a torchlight. Report was first made to him by the lookout that he, the lookout, saw a bright light ahead, but presently he saw both a red and green light, and thereupon reported to the mate that there was a steamer ahead, and he testifies that the mate immediately lighted the torch. He states that he watched the approaching lights and that they appeared to be nearly ahead, gaining a little to the windward, until they opened out "to our port bow," which was their weather bow; and continuing the narrative he says that the next thing that he saw was the propeller seemed to be coming down on to the schooner, when he called to the men below to come on deck and look out for themselves. He went on duty at eight o'clock, and he states that just after that, the schooner was put upon a course of southwest by west half west, that she had been on that course a half hour or more before the collision, and that she was kept on that course to the time it was changed by the master, which was after the master came on deck, just before the propeller struck the schooner.[*] No one could have better means of *56 knowledge than the lookout enjoyed, as he was on the deck when the propeller was first discovered and continued there until the collision occurred, and he testifies in the most positive terms that he knows what the compass course of the schooner was, and that it was not changed before the order was given by the master, as before stated, and that he heard the order when it was given by the master to the wheelsman to make that change.
Equally positive testimony to the same effect is given by the man at the wheel, who testifies that no change was made in the helm of the schooner from the time she was put upon the course of southwest by west half west until the master sung out, put the helm up, when the schooner was not more than half her length from the propeller, that the propeller at that time was off the port bow of the schooner heading about midships of the latter vessel; and he adds, with emphasis, that "no other change was made in the course of our vessel from the time the white light was reported down to the collision."
Until just prior to the collision the master was in the cabin, which was on deck, but he heard the report of the lookout to the mate that there was a light ahead, and heard the order of the mate to the man at the wheel to keep the vessel steady and not to let her fall off. He lighted the first torch for the mate, but when he heard the lookout say it is a steamer coming right towards the schooner, he, the master, jumped on deck and got on the cabin roof, where he could see the approaching lights about a half point on the weather bow and probably one-fourth of a mile distant. Inquiry was made by him of the man at the wheel how the schooner was heading, and he replied that she was on her course, and the master testifies that at one time as he stood on the cabin watching the lights of the propeller he caught a glance of the port side of her hull, and he states that she seemed to advance in that way until she came within about a hundred feet of the schooner, when she suddenly changed her course, and that when he saw that change he gave the order to the wheelsman to put the helm hard up. Such a *57 change cannot be regarded as a culpable act, as it is clear that the collision was then inevitable, and it is highly probable that if it had not been given the destruction of the schooner would have been so sudden as to have prevented the master and crew from escaping from the wreck.
Clements, the cook and steward, was also examined, and his testimony accords in all substantial respects with the other witnesses called by the libellant.
Witnesses, it is true, were examined by the respondents, whose accounts of the circumstances preceding the collision differ in many respects from the statements made by the witnesses of the libellant, but their testimony is not of a character to warrant the court to impute wilful false-swearing to the witnesses who were on the deck of the schooner, and the court is of the opinion that it is scarcely possible to adopt the theory of the respondents without coming to the conclusion that the libellant's witnesses have committed wilful perjury.
Several theories are suggested which it is argued show that it is highly improbable that the collision would have occurred if the schooner had kept her course, as the libellant insists she did, but it is clear that the schooner was sunk by a blow from the propeller, and in the opinion of the court the evidence to show that the schooner did keep her course until the collision was inevitable is too strong to be overcome by any or all of the theories suggested in argument by the respondents. Most of the theories suggested by the respondents as tending to show that the schooner did not keep her course, as assumed by the libellant, are based upon the estimates of time and distance made by the witnesses who were on board the propeller, which, in the judgment of the court, are far too liberal and quite unreliable; as, if admitted to their full extent, they would show that the collision could not have occurred. Doubtless the helm of the propeller was put to starboard when the first torchlight was displayed on the schooner, but it is highly probable that the two vessels were much nearer together than is supposed by the witnesses, as it is evident if they *58 were two miles apart at that time and much change was made in her wheel, that the collision would have been avoided unless a counterchange was made in the wheel before the distance between the two vessels was overcome. Carefully examined, it will be seen that the testimony of the respondents does not show that the schooner changed her course but once after her signal-lights were first seen, and that change is admitted by the witnesses of the libellant. But they differ widely in one respect from the respondent's witnesses, as the latter assume that the collision would have been avoided if that change of course had not been made, whereas the libellant's witnesses testify to the effect that it was not made until the collision was inevitable, and the court is of the opinion that the latter theory is satisfactorily proved. Inferences from circumstantial facts may frequently amount to full proof of a given theory, and may even be strong enough to overcome the force and effect of direct testimony to the contrary, but the circumstances invoked in argument by the respondents in this case are not sufficiently persuasive and convincing to justify the court in adopting a conclusion directly opposed to the positive testimony of all the witnesses who were on the deck of the schooner just before and at the time the disaster occurred. Beyond doubt they must know what the circumstances were, and the record furnishes no sufficient reason to warrant the court in imputing to them wilful falsehood.
DECREE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT REVERSED, and the cause remanded with directions to
AFFIRM THE DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT.
[*] Mail Steamship Co. v. Rumball, 21 Howard, 384; 13 Stat. at Large, 60, 61
[*] The Merrimac, 14 Wallace, 203.
[*] As the Reporter read the record it was the mate, not the lookout, who testified to this last fact (see supra, 43). This difference is, however, unimportant. REP.
